The authors consider postwar political realism (a struggle for power dominated by organized violence) an inadequate basis for analyzing the politics of interdependence. They consider it merely an ideal type and propose confronting it with another ideal type, that of complex interdependence, which they believe comes closer to reality than realism.

According to Keohane and Nye, the assumptions realists base their thesis on are:
1. states as coherent units are the dominant actors in world politics;
2. force is a usable and effective instrument of policy;
3. world politics is an hierarchy of issues headed by questions of military security: the 'high politics' of miltary security dominates the 'low politics' of economic and social affairs.

The concept of complex interdependence challenges these assumptions. It has three main characteristics:
1. multple channels (interstate, transgovernmental and transnational relations) connect societies, including through informal ties between governmental elites as well as formal foreign office arrangements; informal ties among nongovernmental elites (face-to-face and through telecomunications) and transnational organizations (such as mulitnational banks or corportations);
2. the agenda of interstate relationships consists of multple issues that are not arranged in a clear or consistent hierarchy; therefore, military security does not consistently dominate the agenda (in most situations, the effects of military force are both costly and uncertain);
3. military force is not used by governments towards other governments within the region, or on the issues, when complex interdependence prevails; it would be irrelevant, for example, to resolve disagreements on economic issues through military force.

These three characteristics give rise to distinctive political processes (I would say to a distinctive analysis of political processes). The authors here introduce their concept of 'linking strategies' explaining that economic and political, both formal and informal, relations between different actors within and across nations have more and more influence over the way these interact. Nations with no direct military power may have negotiating power and influence the agenda; less vulnerable states will use their asymmetrical interdependence in particular groups of issues as a source of power, including international organizations and transnational actors and flows. And the latter can even enforce the negotiating power of weaker states. Therefore, under complex interdependency, the agenda will be affected by the international and domestic problems created by economic growth (or lack of growth) and by the increasing sensitivity interdepedence of states.

Withing this context, three new groups of actors are crucially important:
1. discontented domestic groups that politicize issues and force those that were once considered domestic onto the interstate agenda;
2. multinational corporations that play a significant role both as independent actors and as instruments manipulated by governments;
3. internations institutions whose role in political barcaining increases, as the world now deals multiple issues that are imperfectly linked and in which coalitions are formed transnationally and transgovernmentally. In this world, international institutions act as catalysts for coalition-formation, arenas for political initiatives and linkage by weak states.

This analysis for me is important. It underlines that political processes are at least as important as economic processes to understand what is going on in the world. The arrival of new actors in the political arena, facilitated by communication networks, makes the world principally different. Political issues that were neglected due to ignorance are now known and discussed at all levels of society. Unfair play and corruption, abuse of power and failure to comply to regulations may now slowly but surely be controlled as a consequence of the demands of traditionally powerless groups... We do not know what will happen, as other groups may get corrupted, but we do know that lately a lot of dirty clothes has come out of the pile, thanks to the increased participation and organization of new actors. This is an interesting move that opens new perspectives: away from the Weberian vision of legitimate violence (as there is no legitimate violence) towards one that recognizes the inacceptable costs and uncertainty of military force (and its uselessness), and the potential effectiveness of cooperation and negotiation. A new game in the making.